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Kazakhstan’s National IdentityBuilding Policy: Soviet Legacy, State
Efforts, and Societal Reactions
Aziz Burkhanov†
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to profound changes in ethnicity
and identity policies and practices in the newly independent countries,
including Kazakhstan. The multiethnic population of Kazakhstan presented
an immense challenge for the new regime and its approaches to the identitybuilding policies. This Article focuses on the identity-building policies of
Kazakhstan and offers an overview of the legal framework regulating
language use, education, media, citizenship, and official identity policy. This
Article also focuses on the implementation of the officially stated policies and
explores reasons behind inconsistencies and discrepancies between the
declared policies and the de facto situation on the ground. Finally, this Article
looks at the societal reactions towards the official identity and language
policies expressed in the country’s public and media discourse. This Article
argues that Kazakhstan’s post-independence identity-building process is
affected by several important implications, including the legacy of Soviet
nationality policy, significant continuity with late-Soviet policies and
practices, the search for a new identity, and the regime’s aim to prevent
political confrontation along ethnic lines by assuring Kazakh hegemony
while allowing nominal minority representation.

† Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University
(Astana, Kazakhstan).
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Introduction
Studies of the national identity issues in Kazakhstan and other postSoviet Central Asian countries expanded considerably with reactivation of
the nation-building processes in these countries after the collapse of the
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Soviet Union. The scholarship mainly concentrated on several important
areas, such as “revengeful” and nationalist Kazakhization processes; uneasy
relations between Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, especially Russians
living in Kazakhstan; the role of intra-Kazakh cleavages, mostly between
rural and urban areas; and continuity between Soviet policies and independent
Kazakhstan’s approaches to its language situation. 1 In particular, the
scholarship covered progressively nationalist domestic policy discourse and
statements, which were never explicitly authorized but silently supported.2
This new public discourse included new interpretations of historical
narratives about the Soviet past and Russian colonial administration, 3 as well
as manipulations of Kazakhstan’s population census survey data in order to
create an image of a more Kazakh-populated version of Kazakhstan than the
linguistic and ethnic composition realities would suggest. 4 The literature also
emphasized massive and rapid urbanization of post-independence
Kazakhstan which caused significant internal migration flows of young
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1. SHIRIN AKINER, THE FORMATION OF KAZAKH IDENTITY: FROM TRIBE TO NATIONSTATE 80–81 (1995); ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED, NATIONHOOD AND
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE NEW EUROPE 47 (1996); PAULINE JONES LUONG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL ASIA: STATES AND SOCIETIES FROM SOVIET RULE TO
INDEPENDENCE 12 (2003); MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED PROMISE?
51 (2010); Michele E. Commercio, The “Pugachev Rebellion” in the Context of PostSoviet Kazakh Nationalization, 32 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 87, 87–88, 94 (2004); Sally
Cummings, Legitimation and Identification in Kazakhstan, 12 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC
POL. 177, 177, 182 (2006); Bhavna Dave, Entitlement Through Numbers: Nationality and
Language Categories in the First Post-Soviet Census in Kazakhstan, 10 NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 439, 439–40 (2004); Saulesh Esenova, Soviet Nationality, Identity, and
Ethnicity in Central Asia: Historic Narratives and Kazakh Ethnic Identity, 22 J. MUSLIM
MINORITY AFF. 11, 14 (2002); William Fierman, Changing Urban Demography and the
Prospects of Nationalism in Kazakhstan, 27 CANADIAN REV. STUD. NATIONALISM 7, 7
(2000); Nathan Paul Jones, “Assembling” A Civic Nation in Kazakhstan: The Nation
Building Role of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, 4 CAUCASIAN REV. INT’L AFF.
159, 165 (2010); Erlan Karin & Andrei Chebotarev, The Policy of Kazakhization in State
and Government Institutions in Kazakhstan, 51 MIDDLE E. STUD. SERIES *1, *1 (2002); Pål
Kolstø, Bipolar Socities?, in NATION-BUILDING AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION IN POST-SOVIET
SOCITIES 15, 30, 39 (Pål Kolstø ed., 1999); Chong Jin Oh, Diaspora Nationalism: The
Case of Ethnic Korean Minority in Kazakhstan and Its Lessons from the Crimean Tatars
in Turkey, 34 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 111, 113, 116, 122–23 (2006); Natsuko Oka,
Nationalities Policy in Kazakhstan: Interviewing Political and Cultural Elites, 51 MIDDLE
E. STUD. SERIES *1, *2 (2002); Sébastien Peyrouse, The “Imperial Minority”: An
Interpretive Framework of the Russians in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, 36 NATIONALITIES
PAPERS 105, 109–10 (2008); Azamat Sarsembayev, Imagined Communities: Kazak
Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s, 18 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 319, 319 (1999);
Cengiz Surucu, Modernity, Nationalism, Resistance: Identity Politics in Post-Soviet
Kazakhstan, 21 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 385, 385 (2002); Ingvar Svanberg, In Search of a
Kazakhstani Identity, 4 J. AREA STUD. 113, 120–21 (1994); Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Rob
Kevlihan, State-building, Identity and Nationalism in Kazakhstan: Some Preliminary
Thoughts 3–7 (Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Dublin City Univ. Working Paper in Int’l Studies No.
1, 2011).
2. AKINER, supra note 1, at 80; see OLCOTT, supra note 1, at 58–61; Commercio,
supra note 1, at 87–88; Cummings, supra note 1, at 182–84; Karin & Chebotarev, supra
note 1, at *1, *2–*3; Oh, supra note 1, at 113; Peyrouse, supra note 1, at 105, 109–12.
3. Carolyn Kissane, History Education in Transit: Where to for Kazakhstan?, 41
COMP. EDUC. 45, 51–57 (2005).
4. Dave, supra note 1, at 440–43.
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ethnic Kazakhs from predominantly Kazakh rural areas into the more diverse
and wealthy cities as a primary reason for expanding radical Kazakh
nationalism. 5 Similarly, scholars mentioned that Kazakhstan’s government
was inclined towards supporting ethnic Kazakh identity instead of trying to
develop a more inclusive multicultural civic nationhood of Kazakhstanis. 6
Furthermore, some studies specified that the intellectual and academic
polemics in Kazakhstan followed the state discourse and policies and started
supporting ethnic Kazakh nationalism through the officially approved school
history narratives. 7 These were oftentimes based on Kazakh intra-ethnic
tribal affiliations and genealogies. 8 In terms of timeline, the scholarship
distinguishes stages of more explicit Kazakh nationalism in the early to mid1990s, with a gradual political mobilization, albeit limited, of the ethnic
Russians. 9 Others claim that, in contrast, Kazakh nationalist groups have
criticized the government’s policies because in their view they are
inconsistent and not nationalist enough. 10
Language policy in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is another important issue
illustrating the dynamics of the national identity situation in the country.
Here, the scholarship touches upon the usage and legal status of the Russian
language and its role as an important communication tool in Kazakhstan. 11
Another important implication is a gradual, although more sporadic than
systematic, enforcement of stricter Kazakh language proficiency
requirements in the government’s office work, in the educational sphere, and
in everyday life, 12 and the role of the Kazakh language in reestablishing the
sense of Kazakh groupness. 13
I.

Kazakhstan’s Official Identity and Language Policies

5. See, e.g., Fierman, supra note 1, at 14–17.
6. See, e.g., Svanberg, supra note 1, at 120.
7. Alexander C. Diener, National Territory and the Reconstruction of History in
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Kazakhstan, 43 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 632, 639–42 (2002).
8. See Esenova, supra note 1, at 21–24.
9. See, e.g., Sarsembayev, supra note 1, at 332, 334–37.
10. Oka, supra note 1, at *1, *7–*9.
11. William Fierman, Language and Identity in Kazakhstan: Formulations in Policy
Documents 1987–1997, 31 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 171, 171 (1998).
12. William Fierman, Identity, Symbolism and the Politics of Identity in Central Asia,
61 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1207, 1218 (2009) [hereinafter Fierman, Identity].
13. William Fierman, Kazakh Language and Prospects for Its Role in Kazakh
“Groupness”, 2 AB IMPERIO 393, 395–98 (2005).
14. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 § 1
(1995) (Kaz.); id. art. 1.
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A. Identity Policy
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government of
Kazakhstan demonstrated its commitment to internationalist rhetoric and
friendship of the peoples living in the country. For instance, both of
Kazakhstan’s post-independence constitutions, adopted in 1993 and 1995
respectively, 14 emphasized the commitment of the state to develop the
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national cultures and traditions of all ethnic groups living in the country. 15
Within this framework, each of the officially recognized ethnic minority
groups possesses a “national-cultural center,” which is usually granted some
funding from the state and is overseen by an umbrella agency called the
Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (“the Assembly”). 16 From a legal
point of view, the Assembly has the status of a consultative body in charge of
ensuring interethnic harmony “in the process of forming a civic Kazakhstani
identity . . . under the consolidating role of the Kazakh people.” 17 After the
constitutional amendments of 2007, the political role of the Assembly has
increased as nine members of the Mazhilis, the lower house of Parliament,
are elected by the Assembly. 18 Critics say, however, that the overall political
importance and powers of the Assembly and national-cultural centers remain
limited. 19 In most cases, these centers are just nominal bodies created to
imitate a normal coexistence of diverse ethnic groups rather than actually
resolving tensions. 20
The Constitution of Kazakhstan declares that human rights are protected
by the state and any discrimination on the basis of “origin, social, official,
and property status, as well as gender, race, nationality, language, religion,
creed, and place of residence” is strictly forbidden. 21 Discrimination and
other violations of human rights on the basis of ethnicity, race, language, and
religion are prohibited in both post-1991 versions of Kazakhstan’s Criminal
Code, adopted in 1997 22 and 2014 23 respectively, and are punishable under
the current Code by a fine of up to approximately $2,000 or a jail term up to
seventy-five days. 24 On the other hand, the legislation also expressly

07/06/2017 10:17:34

C M
Y K

39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 6 Side B

15. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 § 1
(1995) (Kaz.); id. art. 1.
16. Yves-Marie Davenel, Cultural Mobilization in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Views
from the State and from Non-Titular Nationalities Compared, 31 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 17,
17, 19–21 (2012). On the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, see generally Akimat
of Pavlodar Region, About Assembly, PAVLODAR REGION ADMINISTRATION, http://
www.pavlodar.gov.kz/page.php?page_id=167&lang=3 [https://perma.cc/YWF9-2EK5]
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
17. Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Assamblee Naroda Kazakhstana [Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan] art. 3 (Kaz.).
18. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 § 1
(1995) (Kaz.).
19. Edward A.D. Schatz, Framing Strategies and Non-Conflict in Multi-Ethnic
Kazakhstan, 6 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 71, 77–78 (2000); Renat Bytes, Ekzotika
gosudarstvennogo upravleniia ili Kto ofitsial’no postavliaet tabak dlia trubki mira [Exotic
Public Administration Who Officially Delivers Tobacco for “Peace Pipe”],
INFORMATSIONNO-$1$/,7,&+(6.,ư TS ENTR [INFO. & ANALYTICAL CTR.] (July 17, 2009),
http://ia-centr.ru/expert/5266/ [https://perma.cc/5NEJ-V7LP].
20. Schatz, supra note 19, at 80, 81; Bytes, supra note 19.
21. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14 §
2 (1995) (Kaz.).
22. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [UK RK] [Criminal Code] art.
141 (1997) (Kaz.).
23. Id. art. 145 § 1.
24. Id.
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prohibits creating political parties on an ethnic basis. 25 In terms of inclusive
identity policies, Kazakhstan did not elaborate a clear and cohesive strategy,
and it largely relies on Soviet approaches. In accordance with Soviet
practices, an individual’s ethnic background is still recorded and written on
the domestically used national ID cards. 26 This institutionalized ethnic
identity is usually based on a child’s parents’ ethnicity or, in the case of mixed
marriages, chosen by the child at the age of sixteen. 27
B. Language Policy
The language issue remains one of the most sensitive domestic policy
issues in Kazakhstan’s post-independence administration. Over the course of
the Soviet era, especially during the early stages of the era, the Soviet regime
established a significant number of Kazakh-medium schools in locations
where few previously existed. 28 In contrast, during the later stages of Soviet
rule the number of schools teaching in Kazakh decreased dramatically. 29
Amount and quality of Kazakh language teaching in the Russian schools of
Kazakhstan was limited and most students (both Russians and urban
Kazakhs) usually graduated with no or very minimal knowledge of Kazakh. 30
Furthermore, during the Soviet time, Russian became the language necessary
to secure a future successful career; 31 therefore, most urban Kazakhs were
trained in Russian kindergartens, schools, and universities and used Russian
as their primary communication tool. 32
The first constitution of Kazakhstan, adopted in 1993, confirmed the
state status of Kazakh and established Russian as a language of “interethnic
communication.” 33 The constitutional treatment of Russian was a clear
continuation of the Soviet framework often challenged by the Kazakh
nationalists who argued that Kazakh could actually be used as an interethnic

07/06/2017 10:17:34
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25. Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Politicheskikh Partiiakh [Law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan on Political Parties] art. 5 § 8 (2015) (Kaz.).
26. Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Dokumentakh, Udostoveryayushchikh Lichnost
[Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Personal Identity Documents] art. 7 § 4 (2014)
(Kaz.).
27. SEMEINYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [SK RK] [Family Code] art. 65
(2011) (Kaz.).
28. See, e.g., GERHARD SIMON, NATIONALISM AND POLICY TOWARD THE
NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION 81–82 (1991); Juldyz Smagulova, Language Policies
of Kazakhization and Their Influence on Language Attitudes and Use, 11 INT’L. J.
BILINGUAL EDUC. & BILINGUALISM 440, 443 (2008) (“The major outcomes of this period
were . . . development of Kazakh as a standard national language to be used in political
and educational institutions. Mass education and the policy of nativization played a
fundamental role.”).
29. Fierman, Identity, supra note 13, at 406 (2005).
30. William Fierman, Language and Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: KazakhMedium Instruction in Urban Schools, 65 RUSS. REV. 98, 105 (2006) [hereinafter Fierman,
Language and Education].
31. Renata Matuszkiewicz, The Language Issue in Kazakhstan—Institutionalizing
New Ethnic Relations After Independence, 10 ECON. & ENVTL. STUD. 211, 214 (2010).
32. Fierman, Language and Education, supra note 30, at 101.
33. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] preamble
8 (1993) (Kaz.).
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language. 34 In 1995, the newly adopted Constitution of Kazakhstan altered
this situation and allowed Russian to be used “[i]n state institutions and local
self-administrative bodies . . . on equal grounds along with the Kazakh
language,” but continued to establish Kazakh as the only state language.35
Such status was further clarified in the Language Law adopted in July 1997,
declaring that “[i]t is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to master the state language.” 36 The Language Law also eliminated the status
of Russian as a language of interethnic communication but confirmed the
Constitution’s provision allowing it to be used on an equal basis with the state
language in state agencies and local self-government organizations. 37 The
Law established a quota for Kazakh-language broadcasts, commonly referred
to as a “50:50” system, according to which Kazakh-language radio and
television broadcasts should constitute no less than half the total amount of
broadcasted content. 38 In practice, however, this new system met resistance
from private cable networks, which, while formally complying with these
legal requirements, put Russian-language broadcasts on prime time while
Kazakh-language broadcasts were usually scheduled late in the night or early
morning. 39 The enforcement of this rule was also sporadic, and some critics
mentioned that the government used this legal framework to silence the
opposition media, which operated mostly in the Russian language. 40
Russian remains in use despite government efforts aimed at promoting
the Kazakh language. 41 After independence, the government adopted several
concept papers, resolutions, and programs aimed at stricter introduction of
Kazakh. These would make the use of Kazakh more widely required. A
complete switchover of office paperwork into Kazakh was mandated several
times, but it has consistently been postponed. 42
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34. See Janbolat Mamay, ZiLִaly Kauym Bar Eken [There Are Intelligent People],
ZHAS ALASH (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.zhasalash.kz/sayasat/652.html [https://
perma.cc/CVL8-MH8R].
35. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 7
(1995) (Kaz.).
36. Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Iazykah v Respublike Kazakhstan [Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages], 1997, art. 4 (Kaz.).
37. Id. art. 5.
38. Id. art. 18.
39. Matuszkiewicz, supra note 31, at 221.
40. Alima Bissenova, Language Debate in Kazakhstan Reflects Russian-Kazakh
Tensions, CENT. ASIA–CAUCASUS ANALYST: ANALYTICAL ARTICLES (Apr. 7, 2004),
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/8894-analyticalarticles-caci-analyst-2004-4-7-art-8894.html [https://perma.cc/2BTH-XN5E].
41. Karin & Chebotarev, supra note 1, at *16.
42. Id. at *17.
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C. Citizenship Policy
The current Kazakhstan’s identity policy demonstrates some of the
government’s concerns about the complex ethnic situation in the country.
The regulations related to ethnic issues appear rather tolerant in comparison
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with those in some other post-Soviet states. 43 For instance, Kazakhstani
citizenship was granted to anyone who lived in the republic at the moment of
its independence regardless of ethnicity or language proficiency. 44 In
contrast, laws in Estonia and Latvia imposed restrictions for obtaining
citizenship rights on those who arrived and settled in those countries during
the Soviet period. For a long time, they required language proficiency and
history tests for non-ethnic Estonians and Latvians in order to receive
citizenship. 45 As a result, those countries denied citizenship to many ethnic
Russians living there and issued them “alien’s passports” instead. 46
Kazakhstan did, however, ban dual citizenship.47 Russians living in
Kazakhstan were forced to choose between Russia and Kazakhstan. 48 If they
chose Kazakhstani citizenship, ethnic Russian–Kazakhstainis became
foreigners in Russia—their “historical homeland”—but choosing Russian
citizenship would have made them aliens in the country in which they lived
and worked. 49 Consequently, almost all documents published by Russian
political groups and organizations demand the reinstitution of dual citizenship
status. This is often named as the main reason for dissatisfaction among
ethnic Russian–Kazakhstanis. 50 The citizenship issue is tied to all the various
problems of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, such as fear for their future in the
new non-Russian state, the uncertainty associated with their own identity,
their desire to secure ties with their “historic homeland,” and a certain
disappointment over Russia’s unwillingness to actively assist ethnic Russians
living in the post-Soviet states. 51
II. De Facto Situation and Societal Reactions: (Un)intentional Kazakh
Revenge
Despite the government’s internationalist rhetoric, some observers argue
that an unofficially sanctioned retaliatory nationalist Kazakhization campaign
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43. See. e.g., MICHELE E. COMMERCIO, RUSSIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET
LATVIA AND KYRGYZSTAN 56–57 (2010).
44. Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Grazdanstve Respublike Kazakhstan [Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on Citizenship] art. 3 (1991) (Kaz.).
45. Citizenship Act of Estonia, art. 6 §§ 3, 4, 6, RT I 1995, 12, 122 (1995); Law on
Citizenship of the Republic of Latvia, art. 12 §§ 2, 4 (1994).
46. Aziz Burkhanov & Dina Sharipova, Kazakhstan’s Civic-National Identity, in
NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN CENTRAL ASIA 24, 25 (Mariya Y.
Omelicheva ed., 2014).
47. KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 10 §
3 (1995) (Kaz.).
48. See Kazakh Russians Say Citizenship Deal Is “Discrimination”: Part 1: Former
USSR, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 25, 1995 (on file with author).
49. Natsuko Oka, The “Triadic Nexus” in Kazakhstan: A Comparative Study of
Russians, Uighurs, and Koreans, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: FROM STATUS LAW TO
TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP? 359, 365–66 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Robert Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force: Ethnic Restratification in
the Newly Independent States, 36 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 87, 93–97 (1995).
51. Cengiz Surucu, Western in Form, Eastern in Content: Negotiating Time and Space
in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan *4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Oxford Society
for the Caspian and Central Asia).
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has been under way since independence. 52 They emphasize a shift in the
ethnic composition of the bureaucracy and argue that ethnic Kazakhs held
almost all key positions in the national government, regional administrations,
law enforcement agencies, and other public sectors. 53 Such an interpretation
fits well with Brubaker’s “nationalizing nationalism” argument, according to
which Kazakhs would consider themselves the legitimate “owners” of the
new state specifically because of their weak position in terms of language,
culture, and economy during the Soviet period. 54 Under this framework, the
new state uses the titular nation’s weak position to justify a new set of policies
aimed at promoting ethnic Kazakhs’ interests, such as encouraging the
migration of ethnic Kazakhs into the Slav-dominated northern regions of
Kazakhstan and introducing Kazakh language requirements into public
service jobs. 55 Emigration of Russians and Russian–Kazakhstainis from
Kazakhstan combined with internal migration of ethnic Kazakhs, and the
Kazakhs higher birth rate has shifted the demographic and power balance
throughout the country and especially in the north. 56 Kazakh nationalist
groups argue that such programs are necessary to rectify the damages
sustained through past discrimination and forced Russification. 57
III. Inconsistent Practical Implementation of Official Language and
Identity Policies
Since its independence, the government of Kazakhstan has approved
several programs and initiatives aimed at expanding Kazakh language use. 58
These measurements include a stricter enforcement of language policy and a
complete switch of its official language to Kazakh, which has been scheduled
several times, because of its failure of enforcement. 59 Accordingly, there has
been a gradual progress towards wider usage of Kazakh in the country over
the last five to seven years. 60 This progress, however, is mainly caused by
natural and migrational factors, such as the significant emigration of Russians

C M
Y K

07/06/2017 10:17:34

NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE NEW EUROPE 4–5 (1996); Surucu, supra note 51, at *2.
55. Surucu, supra note 51, at *2.
56. See CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., ASSESSMENT FOR RUSSIANS IN
KAZAKHSTAN (2006), http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=70501 [https://
perma.cc/QFK8-LNS4].
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Assem Aksholakova & Nurgul Ismailova, The Language Policy of
Kazakhstan and the State Language in Government Service, 93 PROCEDIA SOC. BEHAV.
SCI. 1580, 1581 (2013).
59. Matuszkiewicz, supra note 31, at 220, 222.
60. See Ainur Kulzhanova, Language Policy of Kazakhstan: An Analysis 19–20
(2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Central European University), www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/
kulzhanova_ainur.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP2F-4Z24]; Absoliutnoe Vladenie Kazahskim
Iazykom ne Iavliaetsja Vhodnym Biletom v “Kazahskij Mir” [Absolute Kazakh Language
is not an Admission Ticket to the “World of the Kazakh”], MATRITCA (Nov. 28, 2015),
http://www.matritca.kz/news/27807-absolyutnoe-vladenie-kazahskim-yazykom-neyavlyaetsya-vhodnym-biletom-v-kazahskiy-mir.html [https://perma.cc/5PW4-YZBC].
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and other minorities and a massive influx of ethnic Kazakhs from rural areas
into cities. 61 It can be inferred that although the usage of the Kazakh language
is expanding, it is not the result of the governmental policies.
Fluency in the Kazakh language among ethnic Russians and other ethnic
groups also remains rather limited. 62 It can be implied that for the ethnic
Russians, the psychological factor is probably one of the most significant
barriers to studying Kazakh. They perceive the state promotion of the Kazakh
language as unfair treatment to the Russian language and Russian-speakers.
Some have even appealed to the government to grant Russian the status of
the second state language. 63 Several Russian cultural organizations, such as
LAD, 64 claim that one does not need to learn Kazakh in order to live in
Kazakhstan because all the information and services are available in Russian
and all Kazakhs speak Russian fluently. The LAD leaders, furthermore,
argued that Kazakh cannot serve as a language of modern politics, science,
and education, since Kazakh, historically, never was the language of higher
culture and civilization; rather, it was just the language of nomadic folklore
poetry and epics. 65 On the other hand, radical Kazakh nationalist groups
criticize the government for not being persistent enough in making Kazakh
the de facto state language and see it as another manifestation of colonial
mentality and disrespect for Kazakh culture. 66 Kazakh nationalists demand
the wider use of the Kazakh language and appeal to the European nationalist
citizenship tradition, which requires one to know the language to become a
citizen. 67
According to the latest population census of 2009, the total population
of Kazakhstan was 16.0 million people. 68 Kazakhs, at 10.097 million,
comprised a clear majority with 63.1% of the total population. Russians, with
3.794 million, represent 23.7%. 69 Official census data demonstrates that
95.4% of Kazakhs “can read freely” in Kazakh, including 94.7% of urban
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Neotstupno [Kazakhization Kazakhstan Is Moving Slowly But Relentlessly], AZATTYQ
(Nov. 25, 2010), http://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakh_language/2230285.html [https://
perma.cc/7B3P-4TDK].
63. See Kaiser, supra note 50, at 97; see also Kazahstanskoe Slavjanskoe Dvizhenie:
Esli by v Kazahstane Vveli Dvoinoe Grazhdanstvo, Eto by Pridalo Mnogim Uverennosti
[Kazakhstan Slavic Movement: If Introduced Dual Citizenship in Kazakhstan, It Would
Give a Lot of Confidence], FOR.KG (Oct. 31 2007), http://for.kg/news-49339-ru.html
[https://perma.cc/6BY3-CG57].
64. Russian civil rights movement advocating state status for the Russian language
and a Russian autonomy in Kazakhstan.
65. Matuszkiewicz, supra note 31, at 221.
66. Bissenova, supra note 40.
67. Id.
68. Natsionalnyi sostav, veroispovedanie i vladenie iazykami v Respublike
Kazahstan: Itogi Natsionalnoi perepisi naseleniia 2009 goda [National Composition,
Religious Affiliation and Language Proficiency in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Results of
the National Population Census of 2009], AGENCY ON STATISTICS OF REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN (2010).
69. Id.
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Kazakhs and 96.2% of rural Kazakhs. 70 Among Russians, only 8.8% claimed
they are able to read Kazakh. The ability to read in Kazakh fluctuated
between 74.2% among Uzbeks and 70.5% among Uyghurs downwards to
7.2% among Ukrainians and 10.5% among Koreans. 71 The fluency level of
reading Russian was 83.5% among Kazakhs, including 89.7% of urban
Kazakhs and 77.4% Kazakhs living in rural areas. 72 Among other ethnic
groups, excluding Kazakhs and Russians, the reading fluency in Russian
scored high numbers: 98.0% among Ukrainians, 97.8% among Germans, and
96.9% among Koreans, with the lowest recorded value being 77.2% among
Kyrgyz. 73
Another visible and very sensitive area for revengeful policies was the
toponymics of Kazakhstan. Previously, in the Soviet Union, towns,
mountains, and other geographical localities were usually named in Russian
manners, which included either Russianized modification of the previously
existing Kazakh name of a place (for example, Russianized Borovoe instead
of Kazakh Burabay), or just naming objects with an ideologically charged
name (for example, Leninsk, Tselinograd, 74 Il’ich, 75 etc.). Sometimes, the
ideologically charged name was Kazakh (for example, Qyzyltu, Kazakh for
‘red flag’). After the independence, things went in diametrically opposite
directions and resulted in numerous renamings. The changes followed the
same, although inverse, logic: the imposition of a historical Kazakh names or
assigning places a new “ideologically” charged name, referring either to the
new, post-1991 Kazakhstan (for example, Azattyq, Kazakh for “freedom,” or
Täuelsizdik, Kazakh for “independence”) or to the names of prominent
historical and sometimes imaginary Kazakh figures of the past (for example,
Abylai Khan, 76 Tole Bi, 77 Rayimbek Batyr, 78 etc.). Major objects, such as
important cities, oblast centers, and mountains were usually renamed in
accordance with the decisions made at the highest level of the political
hierarchy of Kazakhstan (i.e. initiated or supported by President Nazarbayev
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Name of Astana from 1961–1992 and Russian for “Virgin Land City,” referring
to Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands campaign. Assel Akzhigitova & Sholpan Zharkynbekova,
Language Planning in Kazakhstan: The Case of Ergonyms as Another Scene of Linguistic
Landscape of Astana, 38 LANGUAGE PROBS. & LANGUAGE PLAN. 42, 44 (2014).
75. Lenin’s patronymic. Ireneusz Szarycz & Kanada Waterloo, The Spiritual,
Cultural and Political in Mikhail Bulgakov’s Tale Sobach’e Serdtse [Heart of a Dog], 61
SLAVIA ORIENTALIS 65, 70 (2012).
76. Abylai Khan (1711–1781) was a ruler of the Kazakh Khanate and was considered
a talented organizer and prominent military commander in modern Kazakhstan. DIDAR
KASSYMOVA ET AL., HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF KAZAKHSTAN 14 (2012).
77. Tole Bi (1663–1756) was a Kazakh legist, considered one of the authors of the
Kazakh traditional legal system. KASSYMOVA, supra note 76.
78. Raiymbek Batyr (1705–1785) was a Kazakh warrior and military commander who
played a major role in liberating the Kazakhs from the Dzhungar invasion of 18th century.
KASSYMOVA, supra note 76, at 221.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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or cabinet members). 79 Objects of somewhat lesser importance were usually
renamed by the efforts of local “onomastic commissions,” usually existing at
oblast or city levels of government and acting on a more or less independent
basis. 80 Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that in the political framework of
Kazakhstan, these commissions would honor any requests and wishes coming
from higher levels of the power hierarchy. Obviously, for Russians and
Russian-speaking Kazakhs, the massive renaming of geographical localities
was a source of major discontent. 81 Whereas Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs
approved these renamings as a form of compensation for the imbalances and
abuses of the Soviet times. 82 These renamings demonstrate the compensatory
and “vengeful” type of nation-building process in modern Kazakhstan. These
seemingly small matters—such as language use and toponyms—can and
certainly do impact citizens’ sense of belonging to (and vice versa, the sense
of being alienated from) a state.
Another dimension of the language problem in Kazakhstan is that it may
cause further conflicts between the two-generations of the Kazakhs
themselves. The older generation, including the ruling group, is already
acquainted with the knowledge of Kazakh, but gives preference to Russian. 83
The younger generation of Kazakhs, however, gradually coming on the heels
of their seniors, prefers their native language. 84 Thus, the conflict gradually
transforms into the conflict between two different generations of Kazakhs, as
well as a manifestation of a barrier between town and country.
The public discourse regarding identity policies reveals several different
understandings and perceptions. In general, Kazakh-language newspapers
tend to emphasize the exclusive “Kazakhness” of the state. 85 They consider
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79. See Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Perestroika—The Nazarbayev Way: Crisis and
Reforms in Kazakhstan, POINT OF VIEW, June 17, 2016, at 39–40 n.17, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2016-06-17/perestroika-nazarbayev-waycrisis-and-reforms-kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/DF6W-FRBD].
80. See Pravila po Vedeniju Porjadka Prisvoenija Naimenovanij i Pereimenovanija
Sostavnyh Chastej Naselennogo Punkta, Trebovanija k Prisvoeniju Porjadkovyh Nomerov
Zemel’nym Uchastkam, Zdanijam i Sooruzhenijam [Rules for Management of the Order
of Naming and Renaming of the Components of the Settlement, the Requirements for the
Assignment of Serial Numbers of Parcels of Land, Buildings and Facilities], approved by
Decree of the Akimat of Astana, May 15, 2013, No. 120-753 (Kaz.).
81. Akzhigitova & Zharkynbekova, supra note 74, at 53.
82. See, e.g., Markhabat Baigut, Ontüstik onomastikasy: Qyzylorda, Ontüstik
4D]DTVWDQ=KDPE\O2EO\VWDU\QGD=KD÷GDL1eshik? [Southern Onomastics: How Is the
Situation in Qyzylorda, Southern Kazakhstan, Zhambyl Oblasts?], EGEMEN Ԕ$=$Ԕ67$1,
July 25, 2008 (Kaz.); S. Yergali, .D]DTVWDQGD÷\.HLELU2QRPDVWLNDO\T0lVHOHOHU[Some
Problems of Kazakhstan Onomastics], EGEMEN Ԕ$=$Ԕ6TAN, Nov. 11, 2005 (Kaz.);
Gul’zat Nurmoldaqyzy, Qyzylzhar Qashan Qazaqshalanady? [When Will Qyzylzhar Be
Kazakhified?], ZHAS ALASH, Sept. 26, 1998 (Kaz.).
83. K. Aminov et al., Language Use and Language Policy in Central Asia, 2 CENT.
ASIA REGIONAL DATA REV. 1, 3 (2010).
84. Id.
85. See Narek Mkrtchyan, The Notion of “Kazakhness” Behind the Symbolic NationBuilding of Kazakhstan, 9 CEU POL. SCI. J. 16, 21 (2014); Aziz Burkhanov, Ethnic State
Versus Civic-Nation State in Kazakhstan: National Identity Discourse in Kazakh and
Russian Media of Kazakhstan 160 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
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86. Burkhanov, supra note 85, at 159.
87. Edward Schatz, The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in
Kazakhstan, 52 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 489, 495 (2000).
88. Burkhanov, supra note 85, at 74.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Id. at 162.
91. Id.
92. Özgecan Kesici, The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or
Kazakhstani Nation?, 10 J. ETHNOPOLITICS & MINORITY ISSUES EUR. 31, 52–54 (2011).
93. Burkhanov, supra note 85, at 160.
94. See generally Jessica Hayden, Dispatch from Kazakhstan: Who am I? Russian
Identity in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, SLATE (July 20, 2004), http://www.slate.com/articles/
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Kazakhs as exclusive legitimate owners of the state since Kazakhstan is the
only place where Kazakhs can build a state; and, unlike other ethnic groups
living in the country, they do not have any other place they could claim as
their homeland. In contrast, Russian-language newspapers tend to talk about
a “shared” notion of the state and its diverse and polyethnic character. 86
Later, however, another important nuance gradually appeared in the official
Russian language discourse: Kazakhs started to be seen as bearing
responsibility for the state and for all other ethnic groups, 87 though little has
been done to elaborate what this responsibility means. Two other important
elements of the discourse are: “the Russian question” and debates between
Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking Kazakhs.
Kazakh-language
newspapers have gradually begun describing their vision of “good,” or “our,”
Russians. Usually these are Russians who live in Kazakhstan but do not
demonstrate any political ambitions, accept Kazakh political dominance, and
do not question the non-state status of the Russian language. Furthermore,
these Russians speak the Kazakh language and know or study Kazakh
traditions and history. 88 In the same vein, it is fair to say that Russianlanguage newspapers have also developed a certain stereotypical, though
much less elaborate, depiction of Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs. They portray
them as coming from remote rural areas, unfamiliar with modern
technologies, lacking knowledge about global culture and history, and only
concerned with praising glorious Kazakh heroes of the past. 89
The Kazakhstan government’s various efforts to promote a new sense of
identity have met different reactions from the media. 90 The Turkic and
Eurasian identity concepts, which the government embarked upon at a certain
point, met a fairly cold response from the public, leading to its
abandonment. 91 The third major attempt by Kazakhstan’s government to
develop a civic-based sense of identity, the “Kazakhstani Nation” idea, has
met the most hostile reaction and is unlikely to succeed in the future. 92
Instead, both Kazakh- and Russian-language media in Kazakhstan operate
with the recorded ethnic-based identity terms. 93 While the Kazakh-language
press emphasizes the “Kazakhness” of the state, the Russian-language press
tends to use a more inclusive term, “Kazakhstanis” (kazakstandyktar in
Kazakh; kazahstancy in Russian), to accommodate Kazakhstan’s ethnic
diversity. 94 The country’s Russian-speaking domestic political discourse also
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uses such approaches as a marker of civic identity, which all ethnic groups
seem to accept to a greater degree. 95 The developments and debates around
the “Kazakhstani Nation” idea demonstrate how deep the Soviet nationbuilding policies and practices have indoctrinated the public. Attempts to
build a civic identity on top of ethnic identification much resemble the
infamous project of creating “the Soviet people.”
Despite the active debate over ethnic problems, the mass media of
Kazakhstan lacks balanced coverage of interethnic relations and it often
demonstrates biased and stereotypical portrayals of other ethnicities. 96 This
is due to both lack of professionalism and deliberate nationalist views. 97 The
analysis of the public discourse on the national identity in Kazakhstan clearly
demonstrates antagonism between visions of Kazakhstan as a “nationalizing
state of Kazakhs” and a “multiethnic state of Kazakhstan.” Kazakh-language
newspapers tend to separate society into Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, while the
Russian-language audience remains disconnected from these debates and
focuses on a multiethnic perception of the country. 98 This disparity remains
one of Kazakhstan’s key identity and policy debates.
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news_and_politics/dispatches/2004/07/dispatchfrom_kazakhstan.html [https://perma.cc/
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95. Burkhanov, supra note 85, at 164.
96. Id. at 160.
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Conclusion
The government of Kazakhstan seems to have chosen the Soviet notion
of “one big family” living in peace and friendship as its “safe choice” for
identity politics, where the Kazakhs take the role of the “older brother”—as
the Russians did during the Soviet era. The government of Kazakhstan
experimented with different approaches and models to overcome existing
cleavages and polarizations along the ethnic lines that exist in modern
Kazakhstan’s society, including Eurasia, Turkic brotherhood, and civic
Kazakhstani nation. The regime, however, preferred not to implement radical
changes or to aggravate the potentially conflict-charged discussion. As this
study demonstrates, the public discourse on national identity issues in both
Kazakh and Russian newspapers demonstrate different perceptions of several
key issues of national identity, such as the “state ownership,” and the role and
place of non-Kazakh ethnic groups in modern Kazakhstan.
The iterations and social pushback against the Kazakhstan government’s
efforts to create a new sense of identity have demonstrated an important
movement in constructivist national identity-building. The government,
presumably the most powerful societal agent, may face constraints against its
identity building policies. The media’s discussion of national identity issues
in Kazakhstan can express and channel society’s reaction, positive or
negative, to the government’s efforts to promote a new sense of identity.
Another issue is the (post-)Soviet’s tendency to pretend implementation
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of actual political and cultural policies in Kazakhstan. In terms of nationality
policy, the Soviets attempted to cover up the fact that the non-privileged
nationalities, such as non-Russians in the USSR, did not have real equality by
using inclusive rhetoric. In terms of identity-building, Kazakhstan has not
developed a new identity policy and still relies on the Soviet approach. None
of the policy projects actually suggest a new comprehensive identity-building
process and none of them mention getting rid of ethnicity records in ID
documents. Attempts to build a civic identity on top of ethnic identification
resembles the infamous project of creating “the Soviet people.” As Simon
states, “on the one hand, the concept of Soviet people obscures the contours
of socialist nations, which are part of the Soviet people; on the other hand,
the Soviet people cannot exist without socialist nations.” 99 The Soviet
nationalities policy was a controversial one, focused on integrating a diverse
multi-ethnic population into one solid supra-national group and developing
local nationalities. Khrushchev and Brezhnev came up with the “Soviet
People” concept, although they never stopped developing local nationalities.
The result was quite negative: the “Soviet People” never came into being, and
the concept significantly traumatized and prevented the development of
culture and language in local nationalities.
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